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MATTHEW D. STROUD 
INFALLIBLE TEXTS AND RIGHTEOUS INI'ERPRETATIONS: 
DON QUI]OTE AND RELIGIOUS FUl\TDAMENTALISM 
Religion in Don Quijote has been a frequent subject of inquiry 
over the past century. As a "vehicle for religious expression," to use 
Ziolkowski's terminology (1),  Cervantes's masterpiece has been 
studied as an analogy of the relationship between religious faith and 
the world around it (Ziolkowski 8), as a manifestation of the historic 
clash between the secularization of the modern era and the waning 
medieval domination by "religious institutions and symbols" 
(Ziolkowski 9, citing Berger 107), as a vessel of both the spirit and 
the letter of selected pronouncements of the Council of Trent 
(Descouzis 479), as a text that fell under the scrutiny of the Inquisi­
tion (Castro, "Cervantes" 427; Boruchoff 40-49), proof of Cer­
vantes's own religious orthodoxy or lack thereof (Spitzer 6r; Castro, 
El pensamiento 240-320), and· a study of the nature of belief and its 
relationship to truth: "truth is always a function of belief" (Forcione 
109). Special attention, of course, has been paid to the scrutiny of 
Don Quijote's library by the priest, Pero Perez, in Part r, Chapter 5 
(Eisenberg, Ziolkowski 2 8), Quijote's encounter with Ricote 
(Ramirez-Araujo, Boruchoff 53), and the more than 160 quotations 
from and allusions to passages from the Bible (Monroy 79-173), as 
well as "minor irreverences" and "occasional jibes" seen throughout 
(Ziolkowski 27-28). This brief overview is, of course, only a taste of 
the scholarship available on the subject, but it will suffice here to 
establish the scope and breadth of previous discussion of religion in 
the Quijote. 
This present study will attempt to view the actions and beliefs of 
the character of Don Quijote in light of a facet of religious expres­
sion that has become increasingly visible and culturally important on 
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a global scale in the past few decades, religious fundamentalism. 
More to the point, what is proposed here is an exploration of the 
way in which Don Quijote's treatment of the chivalresquc texts that 
inform his fantasies, as well as his actions as a knight-errant, mirror 
the manner in which religious fundamentalists treat their sacred texts 
and the ways in which they carry their beliefs into their daily lives. 
The point here is not to claim that Cervantes himself took a position 
one way or the other on fundamentalism, that he intended Don Qui­
jote to be a means to provide commentary on the phenomenon, or 
that he had any conception of fundamentalism as we know it. 
Rather, the guiding spirit here is that afforded to all succeeding gen­
erations: the opportunity and the obligation to review received texts 
in the light of the shifting priorities of the contexts in which one 
reads them, in this case religious fundamentalism as it exists at the 
beginning of the twenty-first century. 
The term, "fundamentalism," dates from 1920 and is credited to 
Curtis Lee Laws, editor of a conservative religious publication, 
Watchman-Examiner. It was based on a series of pamphlets entitled 
"The Fundamentals: A Testimony to the Truth," published between 
1910 and 1915 (Power 43). As a religious, political, and social phe­
nomenon, fundamentalism has been quite rigorously studied by 
such preeminent scholars as Martin Marty, R. Scott Appleby, and J. 
K. Hadden. Some of the enumerated characteristics of religious fun­
damentalism - such as the fundamentalist defense of traditional 
Christian values against modern ways of thinking (Hadden 1637) -
overlap with more general studies of religion in the novel. Funda­
mentalists are deeply concerned with the erosion of religion and its 
proper role in society (Almond, Sivan, and Appleby 405). They see 
their primary mission as standing in opposition to modernism 
(Lawrence 6) and in favor of a "divine restoration" (Lawrence 1). 
They see themselves as part of an immense cosmic struggle through 
the filter of which they seize on and reinterpret historical moments 
(Marty and Appleby 819). The fundamentalist enterprise is nothing 
less than "a proclamation of reclaimed authority over a sacred tradi­
tion which is to be reinstated as an antidote for a society that has 
strayed from its cultural mooring" {Hadden 1641). 
Don Quijote likewise frequently laments the erosion of tradition 
and condemns modern customs; the most famous and most succinct 
of his pronouncements regarding the degeneration of the world 
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occurs in his speech on the edad dorada in 1.11. Here the way things 
used to be, at least in his view of the world, is described in terms that 
border on the prelapsarian and paradisiacal: "Dichosa edad y siglos 
dichosos a quicn los antiguos pusieron nombre de dorados," "santa 
edad," "magnifica abundancia," and the like (104-5). This ideal 
vision of the past is contrasted with the debased and unhappy pre­
sent: "nuestros detestables siglos," "pestilencia," "malicia," and so 
on (106). In much the same way that Justice Antonin Scalia of the 
Supreme Court of the United States views progressive efforts to 
bring freedom and equality to everyone as a Kulturkampf pitting 
debased modern values against impeccable traditional ones, 1 Quijote 
clearly views this "cultural war" as a cosmic struggle. Not only can the 
rerurn of tradition serve as a necessary curative to the dissipation he 
secs all around him, but he himself has taken on the task of righting the 
wrongs he sees. Like fundamentalists everywhere, Quijote believes that 
it is not enough merely to lament the erosion of ·traditional values; he 
must declare his own sacred authority and personally commit to their 
reinstitution: "Desta orden soy yo ... " ( 106). 
From a fundamentalist perspective, the use of the term "war" is 
not merely metaphorical. The world is divided into "us" and 
"them," good and evil. The fundamentalist project is not just a philo­
sophical or religious debate; it is an active confrontation with those 
considered to be enemies (Lawrence 100), whom they prefer to 
demonize and mythologize rather than engage in dialogue (Marty 
and Appleby 820). When others refuse to accept his version of real­
ity, Quijote quickly and menacingly categorizes them as enemies and 
threatens them with violence as in the case of the merchants from 
Toledo in 1 + Although they are willing to go along with the asser­
tion of Dulcinea's just to placate the irate knight, that is not good 
enough; they must truly believe blindly as he does: ";vosotros 
pagareis la grande blasfcmia que habeis dicho contra tamaii.a beldad 
como es la de mi senora!" (60). Rationalism, relativism, pluralism, 
and secularism are all equated with infidelity (Lawrence ix) or with 
an insufficient knowledge of or dedication to the sacred principles. 
Sancho's realism is frequently dismissed as lack of sufficient knowl­
edge or dedication to the cause. When Sancho states unequivocally 
that the windmills are just that and not giants, Quijote's response is 
to denigrate Sancho's faith in the libros de caballeria: "no estas cur­
sado en esto de las aventuras" (I, 8: 82; cf. I, 18: 160: "jQuc poco 
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sabes, Sancho, ... de achaque de caballeria!"). The more extreme 
response to a queStioning of inerrant truth is the charge of blasphe­
my, which Quijote hurls at his niece (579;2.6). 
Grounded in militarism, as Marty and Appleby point out {ix). 
fundamentalists fight back against a society they consider to be 
degenerate, fight for their beliefs, fight with the resources at their 
disposal, fight against those who disagree with them, and fight under 
God "or under the signs of some transcendent reference," which, in 
the analogy to Don Quijotc, would be chivalresque ideals.2 Because 
of the stark contrast in which they view "us" versus "them," there is 
a strong tendency towards Manichacism (Almond, Sivan, and 
Appleby 406"7); the current President of the United States has stat­
ed, "If you are not with us, you are against us," thus revealing his 
own Manichaeism as he, according to his own definitions, separates 
people into categories of good and evil. This black and white view of 
the world additionally leads one to an extreme rigidity of interpreta­
tion (Quijote's actions are so reactionary that even Spanish society 
under the Inquisition seems too permissive) as well as to grand asser­
tions of the individual's ability to change the course of the world. 
Given the belief that they have been called or chosen to rid the world 
of evil, the fundamentalist called to action displays a similar tenden­
cy towards Messianism.3 Of course, Don Quijote is not shy about 
characterizing his mission as divine. When he comes across the 
group of men taking images of saints to a nearby village for an altar­
piece in 2.58, Quijote puts himself quite boldly on the same footing 
as Saints George, Martin, James, and Paul: "cstos santos y caballeros 
profesaron lo que yo profeso, que es el ejercicio de las armas" (954). 
The division of peoples and nations into "us" and "them," 
"good" and "evil" (Lawrence 108, u6) is a function of belief, or, 
more exactly, the belief in the authority of a certain text or texts. Not 
only does the approach one takes to a particular sacred text help to 
draw boundaries between believers and non-believers; it also 
bespeaks one's relationship with reality and truth. As Ron Suskind 
has pointed out with regard to the world view of President George 
W. Bush and his dependence upon instincts and beliefs to the exclu­
sion of "reality-based" facts and interpretations (46, 51), fundamen­
talists defend belief-based reinterpretations of historical moments 
even in the presence of evidence to the contrary. Belief in beings and 
occurrences such as miracles, angels, demons, and the like are not at 
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all dependent upon the ability to verify them in reality. Quijote 
believes that it is possible for wizards to cast spells, that there are 
encantadores and devils, even when Sancho is right there to tell him 
that what he sees is something else. However, Quijote is not merely 
deluded when he sees castles instead of inns (43;1.2) or giants instead 
of windmills (81;1.8); he must interpret what he sees according to 
what he has read in his "sacred" texts. His interpretation is based on 
his faith (in his chivalric ideals), not in facts grounded in reality.4 Of 
course, Quijote's clearest statement that belief is ultimately not a 
function of evidence occurs in his discussion of the Cueva de Mon­
tesinos: "hay algunos que se cansan en saber y averiguar cosas que 
despues de sabidas y averiguadas no importan un ardite al 
entendimiento ni a la memoria" (698;2.22). 
Central to the beliefs of both fundamentalists and Don Quijote 
arc the texts themselves that are considered to be literally inerrant 
and absolute descriptions of a revealed, unified truth (Lawrence 6, 
109; Almond, Sivan and Appleby 407; Hadden 1637) upon which is 
based the law that must be followed in order to act in a righteous 
manner. Similar to the importance of confrontation mentioned 
above, it is not enough that believers accept these tenets on faith, 
they demand that "dictates from scripture be publicly recognized 
and legally enforced" (Lawrence 27; cf. 232). The same is true of 
one's particular beliefs drawn from textual interpretations. Dulcinea 
may not have appeared in Quijote's "sacred texts," but because of his 
readings of them, he not only believes that Aldonza Lorenzo is Dul­
cinea de! Toboso, everyone else must accept his faith-based vision as 
well: '"Todo el mundo sc tcnga, si todo el mundo no confiesa que no 
hay en el mundo todo doncella mas hcrmosa que la emperatriz de la 
Mancha, la sin par Dulcinea del Toboso"' (59;q). When political 
power becomes bound up with faith, the result is an application of 
belief by force, even when those imposing the belief may not believe 
it themselves. Regarding the existence of Dulcinea, for example, the 
Duke and Duchess assure Quijote that they will order all those in 
their household to believe that she exists, that she is high-born and 
beautiful, and that she is worthy of such a knight as Don Quijote 
(777;2.32). 
T hose of us who toil in the groves of literature are quite familiar with 
problems that arise with privileged interpretations: selectivity, logical 
fallacies, errors in transmission, inner contradictions, and the like. 
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Sacred tcxtS, like all others, are just as susceptible to these problems, 
but fundamentalists, even when they acknowledge their existence, 
are able to explain away their importance if they pose a challenge to 
their beliefs. When one pursues the notion of textual truth even fur­
ther, one comes upon a basic conflict in the fundamentalist reading 
of a text. As with the case of all readers reading all texts, fundamen­
talists at some point have to acknowledge a gap between the words 
and their meaning. While the very words themselves are considered 
to be literally true, they also bespeak a truth beyond the words 
themselves that may or may not contradict one or another interpre­
tation. "Scripture may be the highest explicit authority, but it is 
always cited to advance a principle that supersedes, even while 
acknowledging, scriptural authority" (Lawrence 116). 
Consider just two problems with the notion of inerrancy: textu­
al corruption and translation. Biblical scholars are well aware of the 
fact that there are no original manuscriptS of the Bible, that even the 
oldest of the copies we know of were written decades, if not centuries, 
after the fact, and that they disagree among themselves regarding both 
what they say and how they say it. Nevertheless, the fact that scripture 
may be derived from corrupt or ambiguous sources does not deter fun­
damentalists from revering the texts as "canonically fixed, safeguarded, 
transmitted, and obeyed" (Lawrence 108) or from asserting that their 
interpretations of those textS, and theirs alone, are the only ones that 
reflect the truth. Sometimes the argumentS border on the absurd; in my 
own family I have heard intense discussions about the theological 
implications of the singular verb in the phrase, "the wages of sin is 
death" (Romans 6: 2 3) when in fact it merely derives from the use of 
a singular verb with a neuter plural in Greek. The defense of one's 
interpretation can be violent and full of rage. Not dissimilar is Qui­
jote's reaction to Maese Pedro's retablo, which, when it does not 
conform to his recollection of his reading of the source text, as well 
as his larger understanding of the world ("entre morns no se usan 
campanas," 733;2.26), promptS him to violence and destruction. 
And, of course, what is one to make of the disjunction between the 
inerrancy of the chivalric novels and the errors that Sancho and Qui­
jote discover in the first part of their own saga (565-66;2.4)? 5 
In addition to the lack of a single, verifiable source text, transla­
tion is a thorny problem for Biblical literalists. Considering the vari­
ety of languages of importance to Biblical scholarship and tradition 
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(Hebrew, Aramaic, Greek, and Latin), it is astonishing that anyone 
believes that any translation into a modern language can be consid­
ered to be inerrant unless one also believes that God inspired the 
work of the translators. (Not dealt with openly are the differences 
among translations. Did God inspire all of them equally? If so, how 
could there be variations?) Translation, of course, is also at the heart 
of Don Quijote, the novel. While the chivalric texts upon which 
Quijote bases his adventures are for the most part written in Span­
ish, Quijote is also concerned about the accuracy of the book writ­
ten about him. Considering his worries that Cide Hamete's text 
might be full of errors since it was written by a Moor (558;2.3), and 
considering that in 2.62, he utters his famous assertions that reading 
a translation is like looking at a tapestry from the back with all the 
knots and loose strings visible (998), it is surprising that he is willing 
either to give translators credit for accurately representing a text in 
another language or that he is willing to elide the problems that 
translations present. It is surprising, that is, unless there is an element 
of faith in his mission and commitment to the texts themselves that 
runs counter to logical argument. 
Related to the idea of the text that "reveals" a truth is the effort that 
is required to read and re-read a text in order to discover that truth. Just 
as religious scholars over the centuries have pored over passages, even 
single words, of sacred text, Quijote spent nights on end trying to deci­
pher the meanings of the abstruse chivalric locutions. Of course, just as 
some Biblical passages are simply inscrutable because of the archaic lan­
guage in which they are written, or because of errors introduced in the 
transmission of the text, Cervantes interjeccs a wry criticism when he 
notes that Quijote could not possibly have understood the passages, "ni 
las entendicra el mesmo Arist6teles, si resucitara para solo ello" (I, 1: 37). 
The issue of interpretation is also related to the notion of exegesis by 
learned readers of the text who, within the terms of the novel, are more 
or less equivalent to the various "autores" who dispute minor points 
such as whether the adventure of Puerto Lap ice came before or after that 
of the windmills (I, 2: 43).6 Quijote, of course, does not disparage either 
the Bible or Spanish history. Indeed, in explaining to Sancho the mean­
ing of "Santiago, y cierra Espana" in 2.58, he uses the same language to 
speak of the works of Saint James during the Reconquest as he does in 
his citations of chivalric novels: "muchas veces le han visto visiblemente 
en ellas [las batallas], derribando, atropellando, destruyendo y matando 
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los agarenos escuadroncs, y desta verdad te pudiera traer muchos ejem­
plos que en las verdaderas historias espaiiolas se cuentan" (956). 
One important way that fundamentalists avoid problems based 
on textual inconsistencies and contradictions is through their selec­
tive reverence for different passages of their received texts. Despite 
the general disdain for modernity, this picking and choosing of scrip­
tures to fight for and scriptures to gloss over reveals how much of 
modernity they are willing to accept and how much they are ready 
to fight against (Many and Appleby 825-26; Almond, Sivan, and 
Appleby 4o6; Lawrence 15).Those of us currently living in the United 
States are more than familiar with the disconnection between the insis­
tence of the religious right on the enforcement of prohibitions against 
homosexuality while turning a blind eye to matters of divorce, dietary 
restrictions, and the whole host of "abominations" listed in the Holi­
ness Code in Leviticus. Likewise, Quijote, who reacted violently to 
points with which he disagreed in Maese Pedro's puppet show, seems 
to have absolute faith in what the fortune-telling monkey told him 
(that part of what he alleges to have seen in the Cueva de Montesinos 
was true and part was false), while, at the same time," el se atenfa mas a 
las verdaderas que a las mentirosas" (750;1.29). Also related co selectiv­
ity is the tendency of modern American Christian fundamentalism to 
alter its interpretation of scripture that is elsewhere proclaimed as 
inerrant to suit its own personal ends. The theology of wealth, for 
example, which states that if God loves you He will make you wealthy 
flies directly into the face of Christ's admonitions to give away all 
earthly possessions. Quijote seems to have a similar ability to distort 
textual truth into a defense of his own behavior, as he does when he 
takes the good news of the birth of Jesus, which is clearly focused on 
peace, and uses it to support his bellicose adventures: "Esta paz es el 
verdadero fin de la guerra" (389;1.37). 
Jus� as religious fundamentalism believes in the notion of divine 
intervention in one's daily life, and therefore in the power of peti­
tionary prayer, Quijote calls upon his own deified Dulcinea to come to 
his aid in his battle against the evil giants (82; 1.8), which those who 
have a reality-based view of the world see as windmills. The other side 
of the same coin is the notion that one is punished in this life if one 
strays from scrupulous adherence to the letter of the law. Similar to the 
comments of Anita Bryant to the effect that San Francisco suffers 
earthquakes because so many homosexuals live there, Sancho, who is 
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able to turn Quijote's arguments against him when it suits his pur­
pose, ascribes their misfortunes to his master's failure to fulfill his 
vow in accordance with the laws of chivalry: "han sido pena del 
pecado cometido por vuestra mcrced contra la orden de su caballerfa, 
no habiendo cumplido el juramento que hizo de no comer pan a 
manteles . . .  " (17o;u9). This linking of text to belief to law to behav­
ior is an important aspect of the projection of fundamentalism into 
society at large, and is a function of the fundamentalist conception of 
the relationship between self and others. 
One's fundamentalist beliefs are more than just a matter of one's 
faith; they are a function of one's identity. One does not just believe 
one or another tenet, one is a born-again Christian (and, of course, 
the whole notion of what "born-again" entails is fodder for yet fur­
ther heated disagreement). This element of identity is seen in the 
broad cultural, social, and individual traits ascribed to Muslims and 
Christians in Don Quijote. Ricote's statement, "la Ricota mi hija y 
Francisca Ricota mi mujer con cat6licas cristianas, y aunque yo no lo 
soy tanto, todavfa tengo mas de Cristiano que de moro ... " (933;2.54) 
is couched more in terms of who Ricote and his family are rather 
than in what religious beliefs they hold. The question of identity is 
raised again in 2.63, when Ana Felix declares that she is a true Chris­
tian "y no de las fingidas ni aparentes" ( 1005). The notion that one 
can fake one's identity in matters of religion lies at the heart of both 
a certain insecurity regarding its nature as well as an opening for the 
possibility of hypocrisy. If one can pass as a fundamentalist Christ­
ian when one is not, then how is one to know who one is? Moreover, 
who gets to decide who meets all the requirements of fundamental­
ism and who falls short? The answer is that in addition to its strict 
behavioral requirements, there is also a strong egoistic tendency in 
fundamentalism to consider only those who meet one's own criteria 
to be "real" Christians, despite the fact that two fundamentalists 
may disagree in substantial ways about what it is that constitutes 
one's Christian identity. This dispute over who is really who one 
says he is and who is not is underscored in Sancho's discussion in 
i..72, of the Avellaneda Quijote with Alvaro Tarfe, who claims to be 
a great friend of "Don Quijote" (1053). Sancho's assertion, "Todo 
cualquier otro don Quijote y cualquier otro Sancho Panza es 
burlerfa y cosa de sueiio" (1054) not only reflects the notion that 
one's identity can be called into question by someone else, it also 
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challenges the validity of such assertions of identity altogether since 
there is no "real" Don Quijote at all. Even within the terms of Cer­
vantes's literary fiction, "Don Quijote" was the creation of "Alonso 
Quijano" and was thus just as much a fabrication as Tarfe's friend cre­
ated by "Avellaneda" (whoever that is; this is yet another problematic 
identity). At the end of the day, if one can renounce one's identity and 
one's faith as easily as Don Quijote does(" ... yo no soy don Quijote de 
la Mancha, sino Alonso Quijano, a quien mis costumbres me dieron 
renombre de Bueno. Ya soy enemigo de Amadfs de Gaula y de toda la 
infinita caterva de su linaje, ya me son odiosas todas las historias pro­
fanas del andante caballerfa," 1063-64), how firm is any assertion of 
one's identity? Perhaps the constructed nature of such an identity, 
along with its fluidity and changeability, are the motivation behind the 
vehemence with which all fundamentalists practice their faith and pro­
claim their beliefs. Sometimes people really do protest too much. 
Religious idealism serves as the basis of both personal and commu­
nal identities (Marty and Appleby 817); fundamentalists consider 
themselves to be part of a reactionary minority movement They make 
little or no effort to blend into the larger society and are, indeed, inten­
tionally scandalous to make the point that outsiders cannot understand 
them (Marty and Appleby 818). To that end, they generate their own 
technical vocabulary (Lawrence roo) and adhere to strict behavioral 
requirements (Almond, Sivan, and Appleby 408). Indeed, fundamen­
talism also derives from the holiness movement "which was just as con­
cerned with correct behavior as with correct belief" (Hadden 1637). 
Don Quijote demonstrates all of these qualities. 
Quijote relishes his minority status. He carries his unique burden as 
defender of the old values as a marker of his special mission as a knight­
errant. He views himself as above, or at least apart from, the law:" (Y 
d6nde has visto tU, o leido jamas, que caballero andante haya sido 
puesto ante la justicia por mas homicidios que hubiese cometido?" 
(98;1.10). Later, at the inn, Quijote protests that he does not have to pay 
taxes like other people:" (Que caballero andante pag6 pecho, alcabala, 
chapfn de la reina, moneda forera, portazgo ni barca" (465;q5). Over 
and over again, Quijote goes out of his way to assen his vision of the 
world. While "intentionally scandalous" may be too strong a term, 
there is no doubt that Quijote seeks out occasions to be provocative, 
whether it is in his attempt to free the galley-slaves (he could just as eas­
ily have accepted the explanation of the guards, r .22) or in his desire 
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to prove his madness in the Sierra Morena ("Loco soy, loco he de 
ser," 238;r.25). Moreover, that others cannot understand Quijote is 
proved on two different levels. On the first, which also embodies the 
use of language that is difficult or impossible to understand, Quijote 
frequently uses an archaic form of speech and references that his lis­
teners are not likely to grasp. Quijote's reverence for old texts leads 
him, especially when he is in activist mode, to speak in archaic lan­
guage, as when he addresses the "mozas dcl panido" at the inn 
(43;1.2) and lectures Maritornes and the inn-keeper's wife, both of 
whom are left as confused "como si hablara en griego" (145;r.16). 
Even when he is not using archaic language, his concepts leave oth­
ers bewildered, as is the case with the goatherds who listen to his 
"Golden Age" speech "embobados y suspensos" (ro6;u 1). On the 
second level, even those closest to Don Quijote have a hard time 
understanding his actions. The barber, the priest, his niece, and even 
Sancho Panza ponder his behavior and wonder at its bizarre and 
incomprehensible nature (r.6-8). His actions, of course, merely 
reflect Quijote's attempt to adhere, to the best of his ability, to the 
strict behavioral requirements expected of him. 
Ultimately, fundamentalism is more than just an approach to reli­
gious belief, it is the basis for a code of conduct. Part of the anti­
modernism of a fundamentalist approach to life is the insistence that 
one's actions must always be in accordance with the models of 
behavior found in the Bible. The Christian fundamentalist believes 
that one must live one's life in imitation of Jesus Christ, thus giving 
rise to the familiar phrase, "What would Jesus do?" Apparently, this 
open-ended question is an invitation for vast speculation in instances 
in which one has no idea what Christ would have done because He 
was never confronted with such situations. Nevertheless, this right­
eous imitation, based at least as much on one's interpretation as on 
the text imitated, is echoed in Quijote's insistence upon imitating his 
chivalric models. When Sancho asks for his back pay, Quijote's irate 
response is to note that there is no textual evidence for any squire 
asking for such thing (748;2.28).7 This adherence to behavior based 
on imitation of the actions depicted in sacred texts extends even to 
those cases in which Quijote has not suffered as  the knights-errant 
did nor has he been provoked as they were. 8 Quijote's response 
implies that his approach to living as a fundamentalist knight-errant 
is somehow purer even than that of the knights in the book precise-
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ly because he has no real reason to live as he does: "esa es la fineza 
de mi negocio; que volverse loco un caballero andante con causa, ni 
grado ni gracias: el toque esta desatinar sin ocasi6n ... " (2 3 8;x.2 5). His 
efforts to decide whom to imitate in the Sierra Morena (u6) clearly 
show that it does not really matter to him what he does, only that he 
can ultimately point to some textual model rather than logic, reason, 
or common sense, as the basis of his actions. 
As all readers of Don Quijote come to realize, a great part of the 
joy of reading the book lies in the fact that we, too, are caught up in 
questions of truth and fiction just as the character Quijote was. 
When the priest pronounces him "truthfully" dead ("verdadera­
mente se muere," 1064), the notions of truth, our faith in the written 
text, and even the nature of belief itself have been so tested, not to 
say manipulated, that we find ourselves believing that Quijote really 
is dead and that there will be no further episodes. That Cervantes 
assumed that future authors would take his word that Quijote was 
dead and, even more astonishingly considering its success, the fact 
that other authors took him at his word, is a testament to the power 
of belief in a text, even when one knows there are problems with it, 
even when one knows that it is pure fiction. Don Quijote is a fun­
damentalist believer in inerrant texts, and his story invites us into his 
world of certainty and faith, not so much in the adventures of 
knights errant, but in the power of fiction and interpretation over all 
evidence to the contrary. Like the fundamentalist's "faith-based 
world," the readers of Don Quijote are quite familiar with the way 
in which one's beliefs and one's hopes can trump one's logic and 
one's understanding of the "reality-based world." This relationship, 
which lies at the heart of the Baroque preoccupation with reality and 
appearance, may have been disdained and marginalized by the 
Enlightenment, but, as modern religious fundamentalism shows us, 
it has hardly ceased to exist. 
At the same time that this reading of the Quijote tells us some­
thing about a religious fundamentalist view of the world, it also 
reveals something about the nature of literature and the way one 
reads a text. Quijote's principal failing is that he fails to read his 
source texts as stories, as literature, as fiction. By insisting that they 
are history, he denies them any validity as works of art. His criti­
cisms of both the Avellaneda text and his own Part I are based more 
on the accuracy of the events described than on the literary values 
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that they present. The dichotomy between history and fiction in the 
Quijote has been well studied, but when one couches this conflict in 
terms of religious belief, it takes on a new and strikingly more rele­
vant meaning. Reading Cervantes's masterpiece forces the reader to 
confront the possibility that "history" may be far from factual and 
that "fiction" may present greater truths even if they are in abstract­
ed form. Ultimately, all readings (whether literalist, interpretive, or 
casual) view some aspects of the texts as important, to the exclusion 
of others. Moreover, a righteous literalist interpretation of a sacred 
inviolate text always eventually confronts different viewpoints 
expressed by other readers who are equally as firm in their beliefs of 
their correctness. Unfortunately, as Quijote's misadventures, seven­
teenth-century intolerance, and twenty-first century terrorism show 
us, readers may still be seduced by the notion of an infallible text. 
The dangers of such interpretations are real, and that is one of the 
great truths of Don Quijote, expressed in a web of fiction, history, 
belief, and religion. 
Notes 
I. Scalia's use of the German term, in his dissent in Romer v. Evans 
(517 U.S. at 636), was the first instance of its use in Supreme Court deci­
sions. For more on the legal contexts of "Kulturkampf," as well as the 
full legal citation of Scalia's dissenting opinion, see Michaelson. 
2. It would not be accurate to assert that there is no linkage between 
Quijote's fundamentalist devotion to chivalresque notions and his 
Christian beliefs. There are numerous times in which Quijote conflates 
his belief in the chivalric novels with his belief in Christianity (which 
does not depart from the warlike approach to Christianity of the novels 
themselves), as when he notes that one of his missions is to extirpate the 
seven deadly sins from the "gigantcs" they meet (594;2.8). Nevertheless, 
the texts upon which he relics are almost exclusively chivalric rather 
than religious, which at least indirectly creates a division between the 
two kinds of texts from which he derives his motivation. 
3. Almond, Sivan, and Appleby 407-8. Perhaps because of the male-
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dominated nature of traditional societies, and despite the presence of many 
women in fundamentalist movements, an additional characteristic is the 
fact that such movements are inevitably led by males (Marty and Appleby 
826) or, more specifically, populated by "secondary-level male elites led by 
a charismatic leader" who, of course, is also male (Lawrence 100; cf. 141). 
4. As has been well documented, Quijote's willingness to believe in 
a truth that goes contrary to what his eyes and good judgment tells him 
is for the most part turned on its head in Part 2. Consider the appear­
ance of the "devil" who comes to announce the arrival of Montesinos in 
2.34. Here Quijote is quite skeptical: "'Si vos fuerades Diablo ... , ya 
hubierades conocido al ta! caballero don Quijote de la Mancha, pues le 
teneis delante'" (794). 
5. While Quijote adopts an attitude of textual infallibility, the novel 
as a whole clearly docs not. Quite ironically, the myriad layers of textu­
al uncertainty reflect to a remarkable degree the problems facing those 
who view Biblical scripture as a fixed text that cannot be challenged. In 
both cases, the narrative thread is complicated by a profusion of voic­
es: multiple authors who are either completely unknown except through 
the very texts themselves, tl'2nslators, lost manuscripts, and editorial 
judgments that one or another part of a text is apocryphal, the same 
term applied to those books of the Bible that are to be revered but not 
necessarily believed as undisputed truth (the narrator even uses the term 
"ap6crifo;" sec 570, 573;2.5). Those who have studied Don Quijote as a 
criticism of religious dogma have not frequently addressed the notion of 
t�ual infallibility head on, but the evidence is there, and it is the same 
kind of overwhelming evidence that confronts modern fundamentalists, 
who have actually been known to state that Jesus Christ himself spoke 
in King James English. 
6. The proliferation of authors and narrative voices in the text is also 
an echo of the various Biblical authors to whom different parts and ver­
!>ions of both the Old and New Testaments are ascribed. 
7. It is of some interest that Sancho himself imitates Biblical models, 
as with his decisions showing the wisdom and mercy of Solomon in his 
dispensation of the cases brought before him as governor of Barataria 
(2.45, 47, 49, p). The greatest difference is that Sancho does not make 
much of a fuss about the fact that he too is striving to imitate what he 
has learned from sacred texts. 
8. Ironically, the canon, in his attempt to dissuade Quijote from pur-
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suing his adventures in knight-errantry and bring him back in line with 
Church doctrine, also equates Biblical scripture and chivalric novels in 
his suggestion that, if Quijote insists on imitating textual models, be 
should look to the Bible, in particulu the Book of Judges, for inspira­
tion (494;1-49). In typical Cervantinc fashion, Quijote sums up the 
canon's argument with an apt criticism of his own behavior(" que yo he 
hecho mal en leerlos [los libros de caballeria], y peor en creerlos, y mas 
ma! en irnitarlos," 495;1.49) before he pronounces his statement of belief 
that Amadis and the other knights existed as sure as the sun shines and 
ice is cold. There seems to be linle room for a modern-day interpreta­
tion other than that belief in the inerrant truth of chivalric novels is no 
different from a belief in the inerrant truth of stories from the Bible. 
Even the canon equates the two: "era como una religion de las que aho­
ra se usan de Santiago o d e Calatrava" (498;1.49). In Part II, his niece 
says that Quijote would have made a good priest (579;2.6); Quijote him­
self is more direct: "religion es la caballerfa; caballeros santos hay en la 
gloria" (596;1.8). 
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